

Schisms have marred the recent history of Korean Protestantism.

1942 - denominational names abolished, a United Chh established, which became the Korea Division of the Jap. M Chh. So unpopular that 700,000 Prot. reduced to half that number. ~~By Sept. 1945 denominations reestablished.~~  
In fall, 1945, after an abortive attempt to save the union, the Chh fell apart into denominations. Holiness + Salv. M, <sup>E. Asia M Chh, Spth. Day Adv.</sup> refused to enter + were abolished. E. Asia M Ch. resumed as Baptist.

Korean NAE joined in 1953, affiliated with WEF.

- Schisms: Restoration Presb. Chh (Chai Kum) - faded in North as protest vs. communist reg. Christian League - reformed south in 1950.
- 1951 - Korea Presb. Chh seceded over schism collaboration, <sup>and when the</sup> ~~independence~~ <sup>influence of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>Hechen missionaries</sup> ecumenically related bodies.
- 1948 - Methodist Chh split into - Rehabilitation Meth. Ch. elects bishop. Union the next year.
- 1954 - Constitutionalists schism
- 1954 - ROK Presbyterian schism

## Korea) SCISM

See, you (see 1975 semi), "A Study on the Historical Development of the Schism of the Korean Presbyterian Church (1945-1981)"

Harvey Conn & World Sem Journal, vol 3, Nov 1967, p. 33) dispute  
Kim Yang-Sun for calling the 1952 Korean schism the first split in  
Korean Presbyterianism. Conn [correctly] notes the Jaegun (Reconstruction)  
Assembly in 1948 the first. About 200 churches separated. (see, p. 5, n. 5)

Kyung side - no good reference books

Two notable ones: ① Chong Dai-Sung, "A Historical Perspective toward  
the schism between the Jesus Group and the Christ Group", Th.M., Hankyuk  
Theol Sem., 1985

②

Hapdong side - no good material

Koshin - Chun, Yong-Bok, History of the Korean Presbyterian Church: Division  
and Ecumenical Movement in the Korean Presb. Church. (Seoul: Sumpkwang, 1990,  
3rd ed.).

Tonghap - Kim Yang-Sun (tr. Clark)

Park, Byoung-Sik, "A Study on Schism in the Presb. Ch. of Korea, 1945-1969"

Th.M.: Yonsei Univ. 1971.

Yi Yang-Sun - on Tonghap. (typical Tonghap)

Min Kyung-Bee - does not deal in depth.

Harvey Conn

Yi Man Yot - M Div from Hapdong.

A Study on the Historical Development of the Schism,  
of the Korean Presbyterian Church (1945 - 1981)

Seung-Joon Lee (SBN 330)

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## I. Introduction

The Korean Presbyterian Church can be described <sup>qualitatively</sup> ~~as~~ a quantitative Church in terms of the rapidly numerical growth of its membership and the multiplicity of its schism.<sup>1</sup> These two characteristics are an important foundation <sup>in the composition</sup> ~~to compose~~ the nature of the Korean Presbyterian Church. In this paper, I will elaborate the issue of the multiplicity of the schism, one of the essential features in the Korean Presbyterian Church.

There are three purposes of this study on the schism with four perspectives: historical, socio-political, ecumenical, and missiological perspectives. ~~Firstly~~, by employing the historical perspective as a primary approach to this study, I will observe the historical development of the schism which shows ~~that~~ why the schism occurred and how the initial conflict in the church turned into ~~the~~ schism.

~~Secondly~~, I will interpret the significant factors <sup>in</sup> ~~to~~ the schisms and its impacts <sup>from</sup> ~~with~~ the other three perspectives. First, since the schism of the Korean Presbyterian Church has been immensely influenced by factors outside of the church such as the Japanese colonialism, the socio-political approach to the schism

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<sup>1</sup>According to the 1989 statistics of the Christian Education Culture Press, the number of the Presbyterians in Korea has ~~been~~ increased from 2,530 in 1896 to 6,494,084 out of about 10,000,000 Christians in 1989. ~~It~~ <sup>this</sup> means that within 93 years, there has been 259,800% membership increase in the Korean Presbyterian Church. ~~Contrary~~ <sup>But in contrast</sup> to this affirmative aspect of the Korean Presbyterian Church, there are officially at least 45 Presbyterian denominations in Korea: from the Bosoo Jaigun (Conservative and Reconstruction) Presbyterian denomination which has 29 member churches and 2,471 believers to the Hapdong Presbyterian denomination which consists of 4,561 member churches and 1,930,696 believers.

theological, and human factor,<sup>4</sup> I will not introduce a comprehensive analysis of these four major categories in this paper. These four major factors will be discussed separately in the historical development of each schisms. At this time, this preliminary study will not intensely deal with some important issues, <sup>important in</sup> to further the study of ~~the~~ schism such as <sup>the</sup> nature of unity, ~~the~~ issue of ~~the~~ ecumenism, <sup>the</sup> unity question of the Korean church in general, and comparison <sup>between</sup> of ~~the~~ schism ~~between~~ in ~~the~~ Korean church history and in ~~the~~ Church history in general.

In chapters two through four, each chapter will be divided ~~by~~ <sup>into</sup> two main sections: observing and interpreting the historical development of the schism, and evaluating the factors to the schism and its impact. The form of the fifth chapter will be composed of three main sections: splits within the Koryu group and the Hapdong group, and an assessment of these conservative schisms which includes the comparison between the later schisms and the first major schisms. In this chapter, more emphasis on the assessment rather than elaborating historical development will be done due to the difficulty of collecting the information on the historical development of <sup>the more recent</sup> ~~this later~~ multiplying <sup>of</sup> conservative schisms.

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<sup>4</sup>The four major categories will be arranged by the following definitions: First, <sup>the</sup> foreign factor means factors initiated by foreign missions, <sup>its</sup> policies, missionaries, foreign organizations, and foreign country. Second, <sup>the</sup> socio-political factor indicates factors originated in the social, <sup>the</sup> economical, cultural, and political context of the Korean society as well as the Korean church. Third, <sup>the</sup> theological factor implies factors related to the doctrinal, ideological, and biblical issues. Fourth, human factor signifies factors associated with personal reasons and a very human nature such as desire for power.

## II. First Major Schism in 1952

### A. Historical Development

#### 1. Controversy over the Church Rehabilitation in Kyungnam

##### Presbytery

The first major schism<sup>5</sup> of the Korean Presbyterian Church directly originated in the controversy of the church rehabilitation in Kyungnam Presbytery to recover the purity of the church contaminated by Shinto Shrine worship during the Japanese colonialism. After liberation from the Japanese annexation on August 15, 1945, a formerly imprisoned group, who were strongly concerned in the renewal of the church, launched the church rehabilitation movement<sup>6</sup> in Kyungnam Presbytery which was reorganized in the Pusanjin Church on September 18, 1945.

However, the church rehabilitation movement in Kyungnam

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<sup>5</sup>Conn criticizes the approach of Yang-Sun Kim who attributes the first split of the Korean Presbyterian Church to the schism of the Koryu group in 1952. According to Conn, the creation of the Jaegun (Reconstruction) Assembly, in 1945, in which about 200 churches were involved, must be the first schism in the history of the Korean Presbyterian Church. Harvie M. Conn, "Studies in the Theology of the Korean Presbyterian Church: An Historical Outline III," Westminster Theological Journal 30 (November 1967) : 33. However, since I would like to limit my research to the schisms of the Presbyterian Church in South Korea due to the political division of the Korean peninsula after the August Liberation in 1945, at this time, I will describe the division of the Koryu group as the first schism in the history of the Korean Presbyterian Church.

<sup>6</sup>According to Kim, the church renewal movement led by a ex-prisoners' group in Kyungnam Presbytery requires the following principles: "Ministers, evangelists and elders shall all go aside for soul-searching and resign their offices. When the period of soul-searching is over, the Church shall have an election of officers and vote on their re-installation." Yang-Sun Kim, History of the Korean Church in the Ten Years Since Liberation (1945-1955), trans. Allen D. Clark, unpublished manuscript, p. 42.

Presbytery <sup>did</sup> ~~was~~ not <sup>find</sup> on its easy way because of a strong <sup>set in</sup> opponent group led by the Rev. Kil-Chang Kim<sup>7</sup> who had exercised ~~the~~ ecclesiastical authority under the Japanese regime and ~~was~~ still able ~~to perform his~~ <sup>had</sup> influence. On November 3, 1945, the 47th regular meeting of Kyungnam Presbytery elected the recently released ~~the~~ Rev. Nam-Sun Juh as a moderator who strongly supported ~~to employ~~ the church reform movement. However, the church reform movement was not quite successful, <sup>20 years or so</sup> In December, 1946, the 48th regular Kyungnam Presbytery turned out this by ~~electing~~ <sup>so</sup> Kil-Chang Kim who was a leading figure of pro-Shrine worship.<sup>8</sup> Finally, Kim

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<sup>7</sup>When the 27th General Assembly in 1938 recognized officially the Shrine worship as a non-religious activity and decided to participate in, Kil-Chang Kim was a vice-moderator of the Assembly. Ok Yim, ed., 100 Year's History of the Korean Presbyterian Church (Seoul: Presbyterian Church of Korea, 1984), p. 608. He was also an active pro-Japanese leader in Kyungnam Presbytery where was the most stronghold against Shrine worship in South and produced many prominent anti-Shrine worship leaders such as the martyred Rev. Ki-Chul Juh and the released Rev. Yang-Won Son. Jai-Keun Choi, "A Study on the Shinto Shrine Worship and the Schism in the Presbyterian Church of Korea" (Master's Thesis, Yonsei University, 1973), p. 99.

<sup>8</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, History of the Korean Presbyterian Church: Division and Ecumenical Movement in the Korean Presbyterian Church (Seoul: Sungkwang, 1990), pp. 77-79. How could Rev. Kim be elected as a moderator especially in Kyungnam Presbytery? ~~The~~ Korean history gives an answer to explain how it could be possible. During the reign of the American Military Government in Korea (1945-1948), the social, economical, and political situations of Korean society was very insecure because of the Government's lack of ability to manage and their tolerance to many different political sects. Ki-Paik Lee, A New Theory of Korean History (Seoul: Iljogak, 1989), p. 439. Therefore, there was no secular authority to ~~ask the~~ question of <sup>of a</sup> <sup>1941</sup> pro-Japanese political group <sup>which</sup> ~~who~~ had been very supportive <sup>to</sup> the strongly oppressive policy of the Japanese authorities ~~yet~~. Under <sup>to</sup> ~~this~~ <sup>allied</sup> situation, ~~this~~ vacuum of authority <sup>in</sup> ~~made~~ a pro-Shinto group maneuver ~~continually~~ their ecclesiastical influence ~~to~~ the church without any restraints. This effective existing power of a pro-Shinto group made the rehabilitation efforts of the ex-prisoners' group complicated and led them to go



split off and established another Presbytery on March 8, 1949.

## 2. Koryu Seminary and Bruce F. Hunt

The issue of the Koryu Seminary was another important factor which <sup>complicated</sup> ~~made~~ the conflict in Kyungnam Presbytery ~~get complicated~~ and <sup>a</sup> become the official issue of the 34th General Assembly in 1948. Since the proposed new seminary <sup>had to</sup> ~~must~~ be under the jurisdiction of the Assembly, Rev. Han tried to call as president Hyung-Yong Park who was in Manchuria and was the most influential figure in ~~the~~ conservative theological education circles. However, because of the fervor<sup>er</sup> request of the ex-prisoners' and the returning conservative group, <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ delayed return of Dr. Park <sup>for the</sup> led Koryu Seminary to set up the proposed seminary without him with the strong approval of the 47th called meeting of Kyungnam Presbytery in July, 1946.<sup>9</sup> On September 20, 1946, ~~the~~ Koryu Seminary with Yun-Sun Park as president was finally founded by Nam-Sun Juh and Sang-Dong Han.<sup>10</sup>

It was during the early presidency of Yun-Sun Park that the future direction of the Koryu Seminary <sup>was</sup> ~~had been~~ determined. Park was a graduate of Westminster Seminary under the teachings of J.G. Machen (1934-36) and C. Van Til (1938-40).<sup>11</sup> It was natural that he developed a firm relationship with Bruce F. Hunt a so-called

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radical and to be isolated from the Assembly.

<sup>9</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>10</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>11</sup>Kyung-Bae Min, A History of the Korean Christian Church (Seoul: Christian Press, 1986), p.459.

Machen group missionary<sup>12</sup> who was also strongly concerned ~~the~~<sup>with</sup> church reform. ~~While~~<sup>relationship</sup> keeping a strong cooperation with Hunt, Koryu Seminary began to estrange itself from the mainstream of Kyungnam Presbytery which revoked ~~their~~<sup>As</sup> former decision to recommend

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<sup>12</sup>The so-called Machen group missionaries were missionaries belonging to the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and Bible Presbyterian Church which had split off from the Northern Presbyterian Church, under the leadership of Machen and are therefore frequently referred to as the Machen group. Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 47. There are two radically different appraisals about the early influence of the Machen group <sup>to</sup> the Koryu group. Yang-Sun Kim strongly stressed ~~on~~<sup>the</sup> significant influence of the Machen group which led Koryu Seminary to ~~estrange~~<sup>become</sup> from the leading group in the presbytery. Kim also attributed Hyung-Yong Park's break with Koryu Seminary to the influence of the Machen group. (Ibid., p. 43; 45.) And most of ~~resources~~<sup>resources</sup> written by Koreans including Jai-Keun Choi, who ~~is~~<sup>was</sup> coming from ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> Koryu group background, generally copy Yang-Sun Kim's interpretation. (Jai-Keun Choi, op. cit., p. 108. After Hyung-Yong Park's break with Koryu Seminary, the 49th called Kyungnam Presbytery asked three questions <sup>of</sup> to the Koryu group. One of the three questions raised by the Presbytery was the reason for the Koryu Seminary's use of Machen group missionaries as teachers. <sup>of</sup> This question, of the Presbytery again confirmed Kim's position. (Ibid., p. 45.) However, Yong-Bok Chun and Jai-Keun Choi whose backgrounds ~~are~~<sup>are</sup> from the Koryu group <sup>appear</sup> introduce the question differently, the reason for its use of Machen group missionary as a teacher. (Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 80. Jai-Keun Choi, op. cit., p. 109.) Conn's assertion which is contrary to Kim's position may explain this confusion and contradictions. He argues that at the time of Hyung-Yong Park's installation as president of Koryu Seminary, there was only one missionary in Korea, representing the so-called Machen group missionaries. That was Bruce F. Hunt. By mid-year, 1948, only two others had arrived, W.H. Chisholm and D.R. Malsbury, both under the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions. A third under that same board, F.E. Hamilton arrived at a later date. Further male members of the two missions were not added until following the Korean war in 1950. (Harvie M. Conn, "Studies in the Theology of the Korean Presbyterian Church: A Historical Outline IV," Westminster Theological Journal 30 (May, 1968):147.) Therefore, it seems to me that Kim must have overestimated the early influences of the Machen group missionaries to Koryu Seminary. It was Hunt who was the only representative of the Machen group and played an immense role ~~to~~<sup>to</sup> isolate <sup>the</sup> the seminary from the church, until ~~joining~~<sup>joining</sup> of the other Machen missionaries in mid 1948.

students to it at its 48th regular meeting in December, 1946.<sup>13</sup> It was <sup>in</sup> ~~part of the result of~~ the Koryu group and Hunt's self-righteous and uncooperative attitudes which estranged the group from the Assembly as well as <sup>from</sup> ~~the~~ Kyungnam Presbytery.<sup>14</sup>

### 3. Koryu Seminary and Hyung-Yong Park

On October 14, 1947, Hyung-Yong Park's <sup>arrival</sup> ~~joining~~ as president to ~~of~~ Koryu Seminary gave it an important chance to get <sup>the</sup> a recognition of the whole church as well as to <sup>settle</sup> ~~get through~~ the difficulty <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ Kyungnam Presbytery. However, the Koryu group failed to <sup>cope</sup> ~~work~~ with him and <sup>with</sup> ~~let him~~ leave in April, 1948.<sup>15</sup> What were the reasons for Park's departure from Koryu Seminary? According to Conn. it ~~were~~ <sup>was</sup> the fundamental differences that divided conservatives from conservatives in the struggle of church rehabilitation.<sup>16</sup>

Both Park and the Koryu group shared a common passion to

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<sup>13</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>14</sup>cf. Samuel H. Moffett, The Christians of Korea (New York: Friendship Press, 1962), p. 114.

<sup>15</sup>According to a letter of Hunt dated May 25, 1948, he maintains, "Dr. Park finally gave in his resignation last week." Therefore, Conn argues that Park left the seminary after seeing the decision of the 34th Assembly in April not to recommend students to Koryu Seminary which had no connection with the Assembly. (Conn. op. cit., p. 151.) However, most of <sup>the</sup> books written by Koreans state that Park left Koryu Seminary before the 34th Assembly in April. (Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 46. Ok Yim, op. cit., p. 541. Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 81. Young-Hun Lee, The History of the Korean Church (Seoul: Concordia Press, 1978), p. 240.) Considering the significant role of Hyung-yong Park, the Assembly must have made ~~such a~~ <sup>the</sup> decision to condemn Koryu Seminary after Park's break with it. Thus, Park must have left the seminary earlier than the 34th Assembly.

<sup>16</sup>Conn, Westminster Theological Journal 30 (May, 1968): 148.

protect the Korean church from the growing menace of liberalism <sup>(see below, p. 17)</sup> from Chosun Seminary <sup>through the</sup> revival of the conservative spirit of the old Pyungyang Seminary. This was one of the important reasons why Park <sup>did</sup> decided to come down to join Koryu Seminary. However, Park was not a <sup>very</sup> strict fighter but a realistic theologian who could not ignore the current trends of the whole church which isolated Koryu Seminary from the Assembly.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, he did not want ~~him~~ to be stuck ~~with~~ the Koryu group's rigorous direction toward the church rehabilitation movement and was flexible enough to associate with ~~an~~ other conservatives<sup>18</sup> who would like to ignore

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<sup>17</sup> Since Park seriously attempted to ~~prevent~~ the Korean church from the liberalism of Chosun Seminary, the only Assembly <sup>seminary</sup>, he was strongly concerned to ~~make~~ Koryu Seminary <sup>recognized</sup> from the Assembly. Therefore, he wanted Koryu Seminary to cooperate with the four Presbyterian Missions as well as the Assembly. However, he failed to ~~make~~ Koryu Seminary <sup>associate</sup> with four Presbyterian Missions due to a hostile <sup>relationship</sup> between Northern Presbyterian Mission and the Orthodox Presbyterian Mission. In addition, Park wanted Koryu Seminary to move to Seoul in order to get the attention and support ~~from~~ the whole church. However, his last proposal was also denied by Sang-Dong Han due to his regional background. (Jai-Keun Choi, op. cit., p. 108.) If Han <sup>had</sup> at least ~~gave~~ up his regional preference, Park would not ~~leave~~ the seminary, ~~without~~ losing his hope to make Koryu Seminary an Assembly seminary. ~~Here,~~ it was evident that there were two barriers to preventing Koryu Seminary from associating with the whole church: regionalism and impact ~~from~~ the conflict between two American missions <sup>originated</sup> in the <sup>scholarship</sup> conflict between the Northern Presbyterian Church and the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.

<sup>18</sup> 45 years' consistent oppression from the Japanese annexation was long and mighty enough for even conservatives to give up reluctantly their Christian faith <sup>under pressure</sup> before the Japanese colonialism. This group of people were a majority conservative group which did not want to reflect seriously <sup>on</sup> their past shameful history but rather would like to forget it as quickly as possible.

the church reform movement and were mainly concerned with the growing liberalism ~~from~~ <sup>of</sup> Chosun Seminary.

Then, why did the Koryu group let Park, whom they ~~had~~ desperately<sup>19</sup> needed to ~~have~~, leave? I think that it was mostly because of Hunt, an extreme fundamentalist, or <sup>of</sup> his strong influence <sup>of</sup> toward Sang-Dong Han. Firstly, Han's purpose to ~~have~~ <sup>to</sup> Park <sup>to</sup> demonstrates his firm intention to associate with the Assembly.<sup>20</sup> In his ~~his~~ early period of the church reform movement, Han was strongly eager to ~~make~~ <sup>have</sup> Koryu Seminary recognized ~~from~~ <sup>by</sup> the Assembly. Secondly, Han worked with and appointed Yun-Sun Park as the first president of Koryu Seminary who had ~~also~~ participated in Shinto Shrine worship.<sup>21</sup> He was ~~really~~ <sup>seriously</sup> ready to work with former ~~by~~ Shinto worship participants, if they repented. Thirdly, Han's approach of ~~the~~ church reform was totally different from the method of a separatist like Duk-Gi Choi and Lin-Hee Kim who ~~denied entirely~~ <sup>completely denied</sup> the present church because it <sup>had</sup> became a temple of Satan.<sup>22</sup> Although he never intended to compromise, he ~~put~~ <sup>based</sup> always his reform ~~plan~~ <sup>movement</sup> within the church. However, while associating with and getting supports from Hunt, Han began to prefer ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> segregational approach of Hunt to ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>It was the Rev. Sang-Suk Song sent by the Koryu group who had travelled twice to ask Park in Manchuria to come down to the proposed new seminary. Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>20</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>21</sup>Presbyterian Theological Seminary, 70 Years History of Presbyterian Theological Seminary (Seoul: Presbyterian Seminary Press, 1971), p. 124.

<sup>22</sup>Eui-Pyo Hong, A Trend of Modern Church (Seoul: Eunsung, 1971), p. 95.

moderate method of Hyung-Yong Park. This must <sup>have been a</sup> ~~be~~ the definite signal <sup>to let Park leave.</sup>

Park's break with Koryu Seminary was an essential turning point <sup>leading to the decision of</sup> to ~~led~~ the Koryu group to split off from the Assembly. After <sup>that</sup> then, they <sup>had</sup> ~~did not~~ have ~~any~~ more opportunity to ~~take over~~ the <sup>church</sup> stream <sup>to go against their struggle over church</sup> rehabilitation. Park's departure from Koryu Seminary was powerful enough to agitate Kyungnam Presbytery. <sup>Seiz. the opp.</sup> ~~Grabbing~~ the chance, the formerly pro-Shinto group again arose and began a strong bid for power. In September, 1948, they finally succeeded to make the 49th <sup>called</sup> ~~called~~ Kyungnam Presbytery, with <sup>the</sup> indirect support from the 34th Assembly, <sup>cancel</sup> ~~cancel~~ the recognition of Koryu Seminary again.<sup>23</sup>

#### 4. Koryu Seminary and the General Assembly

Until Chunnam Presbytery brought <sup>up the</sup> a question of the legitimacy of Koryu Seminary to the 34th Assembly in May, 1948, the controversy <sup>in</sup> of Kyungnam Presbytery had nothing <sup>to do</sup> directly with the Assembly because <sup>of its locality</sup> ~~of its~~ locality in Pusan, a harbor city in southeast region of Korea, <sup>for from a</sup> and <sup>which had become of in Seoul the capital over</sup> ~~the~~ hot controversy <sup>of</sup> the liberal spirit of Chosun Seminary in Seoul. At first, the 34th Assembly declined to discuss the issue raised by Chunnam Presbytery. However, since Hyung-Yong Park suddenly withdrew from Koryu Seminary, the Assembly changed its decision and concluded not to recommend students to Koryu Seminary, <sup>with</sup> the advice of Kwan-Sik

<sup>23</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 45.

Kim,<sup>24</sup> the Church Polity Committee chairman. This inconsistent attitude of the Assembly made the problem of Kyungnam Presbytery get worse. The question of the legitimacy of the authority of the Assembly became intense.

The disapproval of Koryu Seminary by the 34th Assembly ultimately brought three groups to compete<sup>in</sup> the leadership of Kyungnam Presbytery, in many respects, <sup>the same</sup> the same attitude of three groups that sought the leadership of the whole church: a Koryu group, a group of liberals, a group of conservatives who<sup>at</sup> worried<sup>by</sup> Koryu Seminary's independent status but opposed the liberal spirit of Chosun Seminary. In the spring of 1949 there appeared three presbyteries representing each of these groups in the district of

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<sup>24</sup>It is interesting to see the background of Kwan-Sik Kim who is a typical figure to show how the Korean church failed to build a new ecclesiastical authority. There was a reason why he was so critical against the Koryu group. After finishing his study in the States, Kim began to work an educational ministry with K.W. Scott, a leading Canadian missionary with liberal theological perspective. The Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea, 50 Years Concise History of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (Seoul: The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea, 1965), p. 32. In November, 1939, Kim joined one of the faculty members in newly established Pyungyang Seminary which was a rivalry against Chosun Seminary and was extremely faithful to the Japanese policy. (Hee-Keun Chang, History of the Korean Presbyterian Church (Pusan: Ahjusa, 1970), p. 363.) In July, 1945, Kim became the first and last moderator of the United Korean Christian Church controlled by the Japanese authorities. (Richard T. Baker, Darkness of the Sun (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1948), p. 190.) In 1946, he was one of faculty members of Chosun Seminary who requested the Southern Division Assembly to recognize it. (Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 95.) Therefore, for Kim, the voice of the Koryu group who directed the church rehabilitation movement and which inevitably held a strongly conservative and anti-Shrine worship perspective must be prevented as quickly as possible. Thus, under this situation, how did the decision from the authority of the Assembly led by Kim appeal authentically to the Koryu group?

the old Kyungnam Presbytery.<sup>25</sup> The conflict of Kyungnam Presbytery was getting worse and worse.

The actions of the 36th Assembly in 1951 finalized the growing rifts in the church. A newly organized presbytery supported by liberals was officially recognized by the Assembly. The Assembly ~~even~~ did not <sup>even</sup> allow delegates from Legal Presbytery supported by the Koryu group to defend themselves. From this moment, the Koryu group began to realize specifically that they had to go their own way. After observing the 37th Assembly's consistent rejection ~~against~~ delegates from Legal Presbytery, the Koryu group organized a General Presbytery which <sup>became</sup> ~~meant~~ the first General Assembly of the Koryu denomination in September, 1952.<sup>26</sup>

## B. Assessment

Prof. Kyoo-Dang Kim assesses that if both groups had been humble-minded and tolerant, the first schisms<sup>27</sup> would not have happened.<sup>27</sup> He emphasizes the human factor as a primary reason for this schism. In some sense, the schism was greatly influenced by some seemingly personal aspects of three prominent figures. First, Hunt influenced by the schism in the American Presbyterian Church prevented the Koryu group from associating with other Presbyterian

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<sup>25</sup>Conn, Westminster Theological Journal 30 (May, 1968):159-160.

<sup>26</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., pp. 81-84.

<sup>27</sup>Hwan-Sung Yim, "A Study on the Schism of the Korean Presbyterian Church" (Master's Thesis, Presbyterian Theological Seminary, 1982), p. 50.



Missions, especially the Northern Mission.<sup>28</sup> Second, Sang-Dong Han seized by <sup>separation</sup> regionalism rejected an effective proposal<sup>29</sup> to make Koryu Seminary be the Assembly seminary. Third, the only concern that Hyung-Yong Park had was to establish a conservative Assembly seminary under his leadership. However, it seems to me that prof. Kim <sup>was over</sup> too simplified the structure of the first major split. Except <sup>was the reason</sup> Park, there were <sup>the disconnection in</sup> reasons behind ~~this personal directions~~ of the other two: <sup>the</sup> interference of American fundamentalism and <sup>the</sup> regionalism<sup>30</sup> in Korean society.

Prof. Chul-Ha Han <sup>notes</sup> demonstrates two accurate observations of the first schism. Firstly, <sup>is the</sup> the schism occurred because of the oppression of the church leadership<sup>31</sup> against a group of ex-prisoners who were honestly concerned <sup>aim</sup> the church rehabilitation. Secondly, Han <sup>is</sup> again argues that another reason for the schisms was

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<sup>28</sup>Conn admits that behind all <sup>the</sup> reasons for the first schism. was the background of the western struggle reflected in the mission bodies supporting one side or another in the conflict. Conn, Westminster Theological Journal 30 (May, 1968):183.

<sup>29</sup>Hyung-Yong Park wanted Koryu Seminary to move to Seoul where it could get more attention and supports from the whole church. However, Han rejected this reasonable proposal due to his regional preference. Jai-Keun Choi, op. cit., p.108.

<sup>30</sup>Although the issue of the church rehabilitation was an issue of the whole church to struggle with, the actual joining force of the Koryu group in 1952 split was limited to the churches in southeast region of Korea. This fact implies a shortcoming of the Koryu group's strong regional orientation.

<sup>31</sup>According to my observation of the legitimacy of the authority in the church, the following phenomenon was evident during the time of the vacuum of the authentic authority. When the collapse of authority occurred, a group of power holders became very oppressive to a group of power challengers because of their lack of confidence in their legitimacy of the authority.

the immense interference of American fundamentalism.<sup>32</sup> In addition to this, <sup>the</sup> self-righteous attitude of the Koryu group should not be ignored as a contributing factor of the schism.

However, we have to notice another important aspect of this split. Although Conn tried <sup>to</sup> to address <sup>an</sup> an essential cause of the first major schism ~~in conjunction with~~ <sup>the</sup> the second major split) ~~in~~ terms of a theological perspective, it was actually not a schism which basically originated in a theological controversy.<sup>33</sup> Since the most crucial factor <sup>to</sup> to the first major schism originated in ~~the~~ the Japanese colonialism whose impact was immense ~~to~~ <sup>or</sup> to the Korean church as well ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> the Korean society which also struggled with ~~over~~ the issue of the rehabilitation, <sup>the</sup> socio-political approach to the first split must be a primary method to further a study of the first major schism.

It was ~~the~~ the Japanese colonialism ~~that~~ <sup>which was the</sup> brought fundamental causes ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> the first major schism ~~into~~ the Korean church. Then, ~~under~~ the failure of Korean society to re-examine its history under

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<sup>32</sup>Hwan-Sung Yim, op. cit., p. 50. One of the reasons for the first major schism originated in a rigid schismatic theology by the so-called Machen group missionaries. Again, Christian mission seriously keeps in mind the importance of the proper process of its contextualization into the mission field.

<sup>33</sup>Unlike the Donatists controversy in the 4th century, there was no serious theological debate on the issue of the church reform. cf. J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 409-412. The first major schism was not also a simple struggle between liberals and conservatives. While the liberals attacked the Koryu group's conservative stance, ~~another~~ conservatives, through ecclesiastical pressure, ignored or nullified it (Conn, Westminster Theological Journal 30 (May, 1968):170), even though they shared almost same conservative theological spirit with the Koryu group.

the Japanese annexation,<sup>34</sup> the Korean Presbyterian Church also failed to resolve many problems<sup>arising</sup> from the Japanese colonialism. It was a serious question of authority that made the church confused and fail<sup>ed</sup> to prevent the first major schism.

### III. Second Major Schism in 1954

#### A. Historical Development

##### 1. Establishment of the First Liberal Seminary in Korea

On September 30, 1938, Pyungyang Seminary which was a bulwark of ~~the~~ Korean conservatism was forced to close because of the conflict over ~~the~~ Shinto shrine worship.<sup>35</sup> After the closing of Pyungyang Seminary, in a daily worsening world situation, missionary work was suspended. Immediately thereafter, foreign missionaries had to leave and some conservatives such as Hyung-Yong Park left Korea to live in exile. In addition, the Rev. Ki-Chul Juh and a number of other conservatives were put in jail. Therefore, the traditional ecclesiastical power of the conservatives in the Korean Presbyterian Church was entirely shut out, which led the liberals or modernists to take over the vacuum of the

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<sup>34</sup>Man-Yol Yi, A Special Lecture of the Korean Church History (Seoul: Evangelical Fellowship Press, 1987), p. 195.

<sup>35</sup>The general attitude of Korean Presbyterians including Pyungyang Seminary professors toward Shinto worship confirmed a Christian belief that according to the Scripture, which is the word of God and the absolute standard of faith and life, Shinto shrine worship was considered as spiritual adultery. cf. Kun-Sam Lee, The Christian Confrontation with Shinto Nationalism (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1966), p. 183.

ecclesiastical power.<sup>36</sup> The end of Pyungyang Seminary era (1901-1938) was a turning point to let liberals have their own theological schools and access to the ecclesiastical authorities.<sup>37</sup>

Under this changing situation of the church, the Rev. Phil-Keun Chai organized a committee for the establishment of Chosun Seminary with 250,000 dollars from the Elder Tai-Hyun Kim on March 27, 1939.<sup>38</sup> In the fall of the same year, Chosun Seminary in Seoul started lectures in the basement of the Seungdong Church. In April, 1940, it opened officially its classes without getting recognition of the 28th Assembly, ~~because of~~ a new Pyungyang Seminary ~~plan~~.<sup>39</sup> The establishment of Chosun Seminary by and of Koreans had two-fold meanings in the Korean church history: a ~~first~~ initiation ~~of~~ by Koreans and ~~of~~ liberals in the theological education enterprise of the Korean Presbyterian Church.

A sudden organization of Pyungyang Seminary supported by the 28th Assembly made serious difficulties to ~~prevent~~ Chosun Seminary ~~from getting a~~ recognition from the Assembly and ~~to~~ cause a trouble

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<sup>36</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 58.

<sup>37</sup>Since liberals were able to obtain the ecclesiastical authorities under the guidance of the foreign authorities, the ecclesiastical authority controlled by liberals began to be seriously questioned by conservatives after liberation. The collapse of the traditional conservative ecclesiastical authority turned out an important cause for the first two schism later.

<sup>38</sup>Dai-Sung Jung, "A Historical Perspective toward the Schism between the Jesus Group and the Christ Group" (Master's Thesis: Hankuk Theological Seminary, 1985), p. 63.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

with the Japanese authorities, because of Phil-Keun Chai's transfer to Pyungyang Seminary.<sup>40</sup> As a way to solve this problem, Chosun Seminary recruited new faculty members who were graduates of seminaries in Japan such as Jai-Jun Kim and Chang-Keun Song. The rise of Jai-Jun Kim as a leading liberal theologian began from this time.<sup>41</sup>

After liberation in 1945, the only seminary in South Korea, Chosun Seminary tried to adjust itself to new socio-political structure in two ways. On the one hand, Chosun Seminary succeeded in getting recognition from the Southern Division Assembly<sup>42</sup> in 1946. On the other hand, it failed to get supports from Presbyterian Missions, which were suspicious about the liberal spirit of Chosun Seminary, except from Canadian Mission.<sup>43</sup> The future strife of Chosun Seminary could be foreseen by these two

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<sup>40</sup>The Japanese authorities was reluctant to approve Pyungyang Seminary because of some of democratic-minded faculty members in it. Therefore, Pyungyang Seminary asked Chai, who got educated in Japan and was favored by the Japanese regime, to be president in order to get an approval. Chai accepted this offer. His sudden departure from Chosun Seminary put it in a trouble with the Japanese authority. Ibid., 59.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p.59.

<sup>42</sup>Since it was an Assembly of only the South Korean Presbyteries, it was called the Southern Division General Assembly. The leadership of the Assembly was still remained in the hands of pro-Japanese leaders who were directly or indirectly involved in the formerly United Korean Christian Church (Kyodan). In April, 1947, the second Southern Division Assembly decided to regard its meeting as the 33rd full Assembly after the 31st forcibly dissolved Assembly in 1942 and the first Southern Division Assembly because of the weakening possibility of North-South unification. Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

<sup>43</sup>Young-Hun Lee, op. cit., p. 242.

contrary positions.

## 2. 51 Students' Rebellion against Chosun Seminary

The first serious attack against Jai-Jun Kim, a leading figure of the liberal spirit of Chosun Seminary was ironically initiated by 51 Chosun Seminary students.<sup>44</sup> In April, 1947, they questioned to the 33rd Assembly on Professor Kim's teaching. The Assembly received the petition and appointed a Committee of eight to examine the statement. The investigating Committee first examined Kim's statement and interviewed him later. The essential issue here was to identify Kim's view of Scripture and his doctrine.<sup>45</sup> The Committee finally reached to two conclusions: First, Kim had denied the infallibility of Scripture. Second, the Committee would not condemn Chosun Seminary because of this matter.<sup>46</sup> At this time, Chosun Seminary was able to defend itself from a growing challenge of conservatives due to its status as the only Assembly seminary and a still effective liberal leadership in the church.

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<sup>44</sup>After liberation, Chosun Seminary became the only official Assembly seminary in South Korea. Therefore, many returning seminarians from North Korea, China, Manchuria, and Japan had to continue their theological education at Chosun Seminary which reached its student enrollment to 350 including many conservative students. cf. The Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>45</sup>Kim stated that the Bible, in regard to the revealed truth of the Atonement was infallible. Thus, the Scripture was both fallible and infallible, so that religiously it was infallible but scientifically it was fallible. Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>46</sup>The Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. 34.

### 3. Hyung-Yong Park's Challenge against Chosun Seminary

The second challenge against the liberal teaching of Chosun Seminary was powerful enough to agitate the seminary and ~~to~~ led it into the second major schism. The return of Hyung-Yong Park, a leading conservative theologian, was a first important stage to regenerate a conservative voice in the church. Secondly, his break with Koryu Seminary accelerated a plan of establishing a conservative Assembly seminary <sup>and</sup> ~~as well as~~ ~~a~~ pressure <sup>point</sup> of Chosun Seminary <sup>re</sup>reform. Under this direction of conservative leadership, the 34th Assembly recommended a Chosun Seminary reform proposal<sup>47</sup> which the seminary rejected.

In June, 1948, Presbyterian Seminary in Seoul was established ~~with~~ as president Hyung-Yong Park, <sup>no president</sup> in the midst of a growing struggle over Chosun Seminary. In April, 1949, the 35th Assembly decided to recognize <sup>the</sup> Presbyterian Seminary as another Assembly seminary and started an effort to unite the two official Assembly seminaries together at the same time.<sup>48</sup> This ironical merge, plan of the 35th Assembly finally turned out to be failed due to a sharp contrary

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<sup>47</sup>The Chosun Seminary reform proposals included the following two important recommendations: Firstly, it suggested to send Jai-Jun Kim away to the States to study for a year. Secondly, it recommended Hyung-Yong Park <sup>as</sup> a new faculty member of Chosun Seminary. Dai-Sung Jung, (op. cit., pp. 68-69.) From this time, it was evident that the leadership of the Assembly began to roll back to the conservative circle again.

<sup>48</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, p. 99. The collapse of the ecclesiastical authority caused the Assembly to make inconsistent decisions repeatedly.

position<sup>49</sup> of the faculty appointment, especially concerning of Jai-Jun Kim. The failure of the negotiation led two groups once again to confirm what they had to do in the next Assembly. From this time, there was no more dialogue left to resolve the conflict, except a political power competition to win against the other.

#### 4. Power Struggle within the General Assembly

In April, 1950, the 36th Assembly was strongly disturbed by a great controversy over the seating of delegates. On the one hand, the Chosun group denied the qualification of a number of the Southern Presbyterian missionaries who were not related to the Church-Mission Conference and were opposed to the Chosun group. On the other hand, the Presbyterian Seminary group questioned the qualification of 5 delegates from the controversial Kyungnam Presbytery who were supportive to the Chosun group. After the Assembly had been stuck with the issue for several days, it was finally ~~interrupted~~<sup>disrupted</sup> due to a disgraceful violence caused by the Chosun group members. Then, the Korean War stopped the harsh

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<sup>49</sup>The replies of the two seminaries to a proposal of a Assembly committee shows that how far the positions of the two were apart. Chosun Seminary responds: 1) Since the two seminaries are to be joined, the two faculties should be unconditionally merged. 2) As to the use of new professors, missionary or Korean, these should be chosen by the board. 3) Board actions to be by majority vote of those present. The response of Presbyterian Seminary was: 1) No one to be a professor who does not accept the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. 2) Professor Jai-Jun Kim, as a liberal, definitely not to be a professor. 3) Board decisions to be by 2/3 vote of those present. Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 76.



dispute of the 36th Assembly until the next year.<sup>50</sup>

In May, 1951, the continuation meeting of the 36th Assembly with the support of the Northern and Southern Presbyterian Missions as well as the recommendation of the Committee on the seminary question made a final decision, <sup>but</sup> without a proper legal procedure<sup>51</sup>, to cancel the recognition of the two seminaries and to establish another new Assembly seminary. <sup>the</sup> Presbyterian Seminary closed at once, but Chosun Seminary rejected the Assembly decision and changed itself <sup>over</sup> into Hankuk Theological Seminary.<sup>52</sup>

In April, 1952, the 37th Assembly furthered <sup>to</sup> enhance its pressure against Hankuk Seminary by dismissing Jai-Jun Kim and William Scott from membership and deciding not to use any graduates of Hankuk Seminary.<sup>53</sup> Everything seemed to be done by the Assembly at this time. ~~After observing a consistent decision of~~ <sup>when</sup> the 38th Assembly ~~which~~ again confirmed the condemnation of Jai-Jun Kim, the Hankuk group decided to ~~stop the~~ <sup>awaken its attempt to influence the church from within by</sup> "Constitutional Defense Movement" and to establish a Legal 38th General Assembly with 9 presbyteries' 47 delegates on June 10, 1953.<sup>54</sup>

On June 10, 1954, the 39th Assembly of the Hankuk group (~~or~~

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<sup>50</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>51</sup>The approval of 2/3 of the members was necessary on the proposition to modify previous Assembly action, but the Assembly saw no possibility of getting 2/3, so acted improperly. cf. Dai-Sung Jung, op. cit., pp. 73-75.

<sup>52</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>54</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 102.

called the Christ group) clearly declared the fact that they had set up a new denomination called the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea with a ironical statement <sup>declaring</sup> showing their strong interest in the Ecumenical Movement in the midst of the second major schisms. There were about 568 churches, 291 ministers, and 21,917 communicant believers in this new denomination. On June 18, 1954, the Korea Mission of the United Church of Canada joined the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea.<sup>55</sup>

## B. Assessment

In terms of a typical theological perspective, Prof. Kyoo-Dang Kim introduces a common understanding of the schism, saying, "Since the second major schism ~~have been~~ <sup>a</sup> involved in ~~the~~ doctrinal issue which might be an inevitable reason to split, the split can be understandable." It was true that one of the causes of the second major split originated in the long history of the liberal controversy in the Korean Presbyterian Church from 1930s.<sup>56</sup> However, as Jai-Jun Kim himself admitted that there were some human

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<sup>55</sup>cf. Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

<sup>56</sup>The general theological attitude of the early missionary can be viewed through Dr. W.B. Reynolds, the Pyongyang Seminary professor of Systematic Theology. When a group of students asked Reynolds questions about other theological opinions, he always said, "We don't need to discuss foolish opinions that go the rounds, but only the Truth." Yang-Sun Kim, op. cit., p. 53. This was the general theological stance of the early Korean Presbyterian Church. However, after a growing number of the returning students from abroad in 1930s, the Korean church began to be challenged by a new voices.

factors which led the church into ~~the~~ second schism,<sup>57</sup> I doubted ~~that~~ how seriously ~~a~~ doctrinal issue had ~~been~~ discussed throughout the second schism.

The main concern of the Jesus group (~~a~~ remaining group after the first two major splits) was not seriously to defend their doctrinal position as well as to criticize the liberals' theological position, but to ~~kick-out~~ <sup>exile</sup> Jai-Jun Kim.<sup>58</sup> The Jesus group simply thought that a growing challenge of liberalism or modernism in the church could be stopped just by expelling Kim from Chosun Seminary. If the Western church was able to grapple with the problem of the Church at a deeper level throughout the Donatist controversy,<sup>59</sup> the seemingly doctrinal dispute of the Korean

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<sup>57</sup>Byoung-Shik Park, "A Study on the Schism in the Presbyterian Church of Korea (1945-1969)" (Master's Thesis, Yonsei University, 1971), pp. 78-79.

<sup>58</sup>In 1896, Reynolds set up the seven-point policy for the training of the Korean ministry which directly resulted in the problem of higher education and the poor leadership. The following two principles out of seven are specifically relevant to this discussion: First, "Don't send him to America to be educated, at any rate in the early stage of mission work." Second, "As Korean Christians advance in culture and modern civilization, raise the standard of education of the native ministry. Seek to keep his education sufficiently in advance of the average education of his people to secure respect and prestige but not enough ahead to excite envy or a feeling of separation." W.D. Reynolds, "The Native Ministry," The Korean Repository (May, 1986) :199-201, cited by L. George Paik, op. cit., pp. 215-216. Considering the fact that in those years Christians were mostly lower-middle or lower-class people, the purpose of this plan was no more than just to produce the Christian workers. Under this anti-intellectual and separative tradition of the theological education, the conservative leadership was capable of neither developing theological assertions against liberals nor being tolerant to a different voice within the Christian faith.

<sup>59</sup>Kelly, op. cit., p. 409.

{ Postscript: the purpose of the plan was to keep the church Korean, with a leadership that has already been in Korea since the beginning of the mission work.

Presbyterian Church resulted in only a growing mistrust and hatred in the church without deepening an understanding of the nature of the Bible and Calvinism. Therefore, I am strongly opposing to Kyoo-Dang Kim's position that the second schism deserved to split off from the church due to its nature of the doctrinal dispute.

Yang-Sun Kim presents a typical understanding of the Jesus group (a remaining group after the first two major split) about the second schism, saying, "If professor Kim Chai Choon (Jai-Jun Kim) had not continually and sharply criticized the conservative position, there would have been no such Presbyterian Church schism as now exists."<sup>60</sup> Jai-Jun Kim admits interestingly his own responsibility in this regard, saying, "The liberal conservatives, myself included, were too much concerned with the idea of prophetic clarity and lacked a due sense of the meaning of the Servant Lord."<sup>61</sup> However, the improper, rash, and harsh legal decisions<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Yang-Sun Kim, p. 61. The name in the parenthesis is the Western naming order that I use in my paper. There is also some variation of naming due to a different method.

<sup>61</sup>Conn, Westminster Theological Journal 30, (November, 1967):26.

<sup>62</sup>Through the study of the schism, especially first two major schisms, it is noticeable that the decision of the Assembly, or the Presbytery have often lacked a proper procedure of a reasonable decision making. It might be one of the possible explanations that it was difficult for the people in the midst of strict conflicts to be rational. However, it seems to me that there are two additional conceivable answers to this trend: First, the Korean church have never been sufficiently disciplined to the democratic decision making due to the authoritarian Japanese regime. Second, like Jai-Jun Kim's comment (Harvie M. Conn, "Studies in the Theology of the Korean Presbyterian Church: An Historical Outline II," Westminster Theological Journal 29 (May, 1967):152), since most of the Korean ministers have been instructed by a 'stereotyped monotonous educational method,' they had a great difficulty in communicating

in the Assembly led by the Jesus group were another aggressive and influential factor of the schism which few Jesus group leaders admitted.

Jai-Jun Kim attributes the reason for the second schism to a sharply different understanding of the theological methodology or the biblical hermeneutics rather than an essential problem of theology in itself.<sup>63</sup> He argues, "it was not a different substance of theology but a different approach how to do theology. It was exclusive vs. inclusive, self-righteous vs. tolerant, cramming vs. critical, closed vs. open."<sup>64</sup> Even though liberals' position had not been always inclusive, tolerant, and open,<sup>65</sup> Kim correctly pointed out an important aspect of the second schism. One of the essential causes for the schism originated in a different understanding of the theological methodology. In addition, regionalism,<sup>66</sup> the deficiency of the Nevius method,<sup>67</sup> and a

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or negotiating with people who had a different thought or background.

<sup>63</sup>It is true that both the Jesus and the Christ groups shared the same the Westminster Confession and Calvinism as the primary doctrine of their denominations.

<sup>64</sup>Byoung-Shik Park, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

<sup>65</sup>When Liberals struggled with another conservative minority group over the issue of the church reform, they were very aggressive to condemn the Koryu group.

<sup>66</sup>It was obvious that while the leadership of the Chosun group came from the Hamkyung province, northeast region of Korea, where the liberal Canadian Mission was responsible for, the leadership of the Jesus group consisted of the Christians from the district of the conservative Northern and Southern Missions. Man-Yol Yi, op. cit., p. 63.

special context of the Korean church<sup>68</sup> were another contributing factors of the second schism.

#### IV. Third Major Schism in 1959

##### A. Historical Development

##### 1. Hyung-Yong Park's Misuse of the Seminary Money

In the winter of 1957-58, an impetus of the third major split occurred in the Korean Presbyterian Church. A large sum of money, sent privately from the States to president of Presbyterian Seminary, Hyung-Yong Park, had been misused in the effort to get full legal rights to the property on South Mountain, Seoul where the seminary were operating.<sup>69</sup> A full meeting of the Board of trustees, by a close vote, accepted the resignation of the president Park. However, the effect of the incident was not over by Park's resignation. The Board, the faculties, the students, and the

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<sup>67</sup>Ten principles of the Nevius Method will be found in Clark's following book. cf. Charles A. Clark, The Nevius Plan for Mission Work (Seoul: Christian Literature Society, 1937), pp. 41-42. Sung-Chun Chun was very critical to the deficiencies of the Nevius method. He criticized the individualistic and materialistic elements of the method influenced by the 19th century American pragmatism. This aspect of the Nevius method accelerated the individualistic trend of the Korean Presbyterian Church with its own independent polity. The aspects of regionalism and anti-intellectualism in the method have been also criticized. cf. Sung-Chun Chun, Schism and Unity in the Protestant Churches of Korea (Seoul: Christian Literature Society of Korea, 1979), pp. 91-96.

<sup>68</sup>I mean here the collapse of the ecclesiastical authorities caused by the Japanese authorities.

<sup>69</sup>Hyung-Yong Park was deceived by Ho-Keun Park whom he gave the money to solve the problem of the seminary property on South Mountain without discussing other Board members and having a receipt from Mr. Park. Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 105.

whole church became greatly disturbed over this issue.<sup>70</sup>

At first glance the issue looks simple. The president Park had to take a responsibility on his misuse of the money. However, there was a factor which made this complicated. A pro-Park's group<sup>71</sup> thought that if Park was unable to avoid the responsibility, the authentic conservative tradition in the church would be collapsed.<sup>72</sup> Thus, they were desperate to keep Park's influence alive. They brought the question of the World Council of Churches into Park's case which, they thought, was mistreated by pro-WCC group. The deteriorating issue of Park's case was well connected with the question of WCC which made an ecclesiastical power struggle aspect of the case turn to a seemingly theological one.

## 2. Question on WCC

The Korean Presbyterian Church has participated in the

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<sup>70</sup>Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, eds., History of the Korea Mission: Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Volume II 1935-1959 (New York: Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1964), p. 270.

<sup>71</sup>Although it was sometimes difficult to distinguish one from the other, there were at least two types of people within the pro-Park's group. Firstly, one was really concerned about Park's influence in the church which seemed to them the essential way to defend the traditional conservatism against the growing liberalism in the church. Secondly, although supporting the theological concern of the first group, the other was more interested in keeping their ecclesiastical power with the continuing influence from Park.

<sup>72</sup>Young-Hun Lee, op. cit., p. 323. This is another example to show the problem of the poor trained Korean ministers. The whole structure of Korean conservatism seemed to be based on one person rather than on a well developed theological system or a sound Christian faith.

ecumenical movement of WCC from its first convention in Amsterdam in 1948. However, from the beginning, there has been also a growing suspicion against the ecumenical movement of WCC which was regarded as a movement of liberalism, communism, and for the Super Church. In 1956, the 41st Assembly decided to participate in continually the ecumenical movement of WCC as long as it concerned unity of the Church instead of the Super Church with the advise of the Rev. Hyung-Jung Kim who attended the second convention in Evanston, America in 1954.<sup>73</sup> After Park's incident in 1957, the question of the ecumenical movement of WCC became a hot issue of the Assembly.

In 1958, Hyung-Yong Park launched a strong criticism against the ecumenical movement of WCC, saying, "In its doctrine, the movement is directed by the liberal leadership. And in its policy, it is seeking for establishing the Super Church. Therefore, the church, which is faithful to its tradition and evangelism, should not accept the movement."<sup>74</sup> Under this situation, a number of people in the pro-Park's group who were actively involved in the National Association of Evangelicals<sup>75</sup> began to plan for making the

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<sup>73</sup>Young-Hun Lee, op. cit., pp. 323-325.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 323.

<sup>75</sup>NAE was firstly organized in St. Louis in 1948 and became an international organization in 1951. It holds 7 confessional doctrines which include inspiration and infallibility of the Bible. NAE in Korea was organized in 1951 by 61 supporters of Hyung-Yong Park who were mostly former students of Chosun Seminary who appealed the liberal teaching of Jai-Jun Kim to the Assembly. The initial purpose of organizing NAE was to keep the evangelical conservative tradition in the church. However, they became a very active political group in the church which finally succeeded to make the 43th Assembly elect the new leadership of the Assembly filled with NAE members. Ibid., pp. 325-326.



44th Assembly withdraw its membership from WCC.

### 3. Question on the Delegates from Kyungki Presbytery

The final stage of the third major schism originated in a question of the delegates from Kyungki Presbytery for the 44th Assembly in September, 1959. The pro-Park's group succeeded in electing 18 delegates from their group over 10 delegates from the pro-WCC group.<sup>76</sup> However, since the pro-Park's leadership of Kyungki Seminary made a mistake missing a qualified delegate from the pro-WCC group who got enough votes to be a delegate,<sup>77</sup> Kyungki Presbytery decided to have another election which turned out the victory of the pro-WCC group, 26 over 2.<sup>78</sup> It was evident that the result of the second election was unacceptable to the pro-Park's group. The last chance for the pro-Park's group to win over the pro-WCC group was to appeal this dispute to the pro-Park's leadership of the 44th Assembly again.

From the beginning of the 44th Assembly meeting in Daijun, the meeting was stuck for five days with a question of two handed Kyungki Presbytery's delegate lists which finally led the Assembly to be divided into two. On September 29, the pro-WCC group established a new Assembly called the Tonghap Assembly at Yondong Church in Seoul. On November 24, the pro-Park's group gathered at Seungdong Church in Seoul to organize the Hapdong Assembly, taking

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<sup>76</sup>Presbyterian Theological Seminary, op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>77</sup>Hwan-Sung Yim, op. cit., pp. 76-78.

<sup>78</sup>Presbyterian Theological Seminary, op. cit., p. 148.

about half of the churches, ministers and members of the former church.<sup>79</sup> This split became insured after a visit of Carl McIntire in October, president of the Independent Board for Foreign Missions and of the International Council of Christian Churches, who succeeded in raising \$120,000 to support Park.<sup>80</sup>

## B. Assessment

There are three different positions to explain the reason for the third schism. Firstly, according to the editorial of the Christ Public Newspaper on October 5, 1959, which speaks for the Tonghap group, there were four factors for the third schism: First, Hyung-Yong Park had been idolized by his enthusiastic followers. Second, the order of the church had been disturbed by a group of people who sought for controlling the ecclesiastical power. Third, it was a factionalism which led the NAE group to obtain the leadership of the 43th Assembly which caused the split of the 44th Assembly. Fourth, it was an ignorance which just preferred traditional way of thinking as the only authentic belief.<sup>81</sup>

Generally speaking, although this is a reasonable analysis for the third schism, the Tonghap group including Prof. Yong-Hun Lee tend to blame every responsibility for the schism on the Hapdong group. However, the Tonghap group never gave a reasonable answer for the following two questions: First, why were they so in a hurry

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<sup>79</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>80</sup>Rhodes and Campbell, op. cit., p. 271.

<sup>81</sup>Yong-Hun Lee, op. cit., pp. 333-334.

to organize a new Assembly earlier than the Hapdong group? Second, if they were really concerned about unity of the church, why did they have to stick to their affiliation with WCC without listening to the other voice of the half churches which anyway took a position with an anti-WCC group with any reasons?<sup>82</sup> It seems to me that the Tonghap group at least took these responsibilities on the schism.

Secondly, although Prof. Kwang-Soo Kim and Prof. Kyoo-Dang Kim were affiliated with the Tonghap Assembly, they attributed the third schism to the struggle of the NAE group and the WCC group due to their radically different understanding of the ecumenical movement of WCC.<sup>83</sup> Prof. Chul-Ha Han also appraises that since one stresses on keeping a pure conservative faith and the other is rather concerned the ecumenical movement, they had to be split. This view implies that there is a factor to the schism which the Tonghap group was responsible for. However, since the third major schism did not originated in the issue of WCC which became no more crucial reason for the later reunion movement after the split in 1959, the seemingly theological conflict over the issue of WCC could not be attributed as the essential reason for this schism.

Thirdly, Prof. Kyung-Bae Min argues, "Since the church,

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<sup>82</sup>When negotiating the unification issue with the Hapdong group after the split, on December 29, 1959, the Tonghap group was willing to relinquish their membership of WAC for the sake of the church unification. Young-Hun Lee, op. cit., p. 342. However, it was too late to call back the Hapdong group which already had a good excuse for the schism.

<sup>83</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., p. 107.

without either making a right decision or having a correct information, was struggling with non-theological factors, it began to be controlled by a group of people, who were strongly concerned about the ecclesiastical power."<sup>84</sup> It was non-theological factors, for Min, that led a group of the political oriented people to cause the schism. I think that this is an accurate observation of the third major schism.

In addition, Prof. Jai-Jun Kim raises an accurate question to the lack of the church leadership.<sup>85</sup> The third schism was brought by the problem of the church leadership which was unable to resolve the most preventable split among the three major schisms, but accelerate it. The schism, for me, was really preventable. Firstly, the third split was a schism among a so-called conservatives who had no serious theological conflict in depth. They both basically agreed with the importance of unity of the church in general.<sup>86</sup> Secondly, after the third schism, there had been several serious attempts to reunite the divided two churches, which never occurred in the first two schisms.<sup>87</sup> Thirdly, the seemingly essential question of WCC turned out an insignificant factor for the church reunification negotiation just right after the schism.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Byoung-Shik Park, op. cit., p. 116.

<sup>85</sup>Hwan-Sung Yim, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>86</sup>cf. Young-Hun Lee, op. cit., p.323.

<sup>87</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., pp. 142-149.

<sup>88</sup>Although the Tonghap Assembly decided to dismiss its affiliation with WAC for the sake of the church reunification, the decision could not help the two church reunite together. Young-Hun

It was both the problem of the church leadership and the interference of a foreign factional group that became the essential factor to lead the biggest schism of the Korean Presbyterian Church in terms of its size and influence. There were three steps that the problem of the leadership became a real force to the schism. First, the problem of the leadership originated in a deficiency of the Nevius method, the problem of higher education. Second, it was activated by the collapse of the ecclesiastical authority after liberation. Third, it finalized to cause the schism with the issue of WCC.

## V. Schisms after 1959

### A. Schisms within the Koryu Group

In November, 1958, when an issue of the proprietary right of Munchang Church was brought to the civil court, the Koryu group was agitated by the case. The anti-lawsuit group under the leadership of Rev. Chil-Hong Chun finally split off from the Koryu Assembly in 1960.<sup>89</sup> In 1974, the Koryu group was again divided by the two groups over the church property issue. The anti-lawsuit group of the 1974 split was divided by another two groups due to regionalism: Seoul versus Masan, an industrial city in southeast part of Korea.<sup>90</sup>

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Lee, op. cit., pp. 342-343.

<sup>89</sup>Byoung-Shik Park, op. cit., pp 93-94.

<sup>90</sup>Nai-Soo Park, "A Study on the Types of the Korean Church Schisms and their Impacts," (Master's Thesis, Methodist Theological Seminary, 1984), p. 19.

The splits within the Koryu group after the first major split in 1952 had occurred because of neither the church rehabilitation issue nor the theological debate over the purity of the church. The splits within the Koryu group concerned mostly the purity of the church were resulted from a personal desire for the ecclesiastical power, factionalism, a church property issue, and regionalism. It must be an irony of history. The formerly admirable fighters against the brutal Japanese colonialism turned out to be factionalists who were never disciplined to work together. Therefore, they were unable to work with a colleague who just had a different voice.

#### B. Schisms within the Hapdong Group

During the dispute of WCC in the third schism, the Rev. Chi-Sun Kim had stood with the Hapdong group. However, since his Daihan Seminary had a financial problem, he organized a new Kyungki Presbytery with the support of D.R. Malsbury,<sup>91</sup> a missionary from the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions, in order

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<sup>91</sup>Malsbury, a McIntire group missionary, has worked with the Koryu group from 1948. After the third major split, he began to associate with the Hapdong group with \$100,000 financial aid in order to encourage its anti-policy against WAC. It was Malsbury who played an important role as a negotiator to reunite the Koryu group with the Hapdong group in 1960. However, this reunion broke up in 1962. In September, 1961, the 46th Assembly of the Hapdong group decided to sever its affiliation with ICCC due to the McIntire group Missionaries' extreme concern of implanting the influence of their denomination, the Bible Presbyterian Church with money. Nai-Soo Park, op. cit., pp. 42-43. It was evident that this mission was not mission of God but mission for an extreme denominationalism which agitated the whole Korean church with money. Many splits after 1959 originated in this problematic mission policy of ICCC.

to get the Mission's financial aid. On June 22, 1961, he succeeded to organize the Assembly of the Korean Bible Presbyterian Church with 8 presbyteries and 60 churches.

Right after the establishment of a new denomination, the church became a member of the International Council of Christian Churches under the leadership of Carl McIntire.<sup>92</sup> After the third major schism, one of the peculiar aspects of the schism was that the fundamental factor of the schism became rapidly deteriorating. The collapse of the church authority due to the three major schism made a very personal desire to keep running one's own seminary become a possible reason for the church split.

When the Hapdong Assembly decided to dismiss its affiliation with ICCC because of ICCC group's extreme interference of its own policy and an attempt to reunite with the Tonghap group. The Rev. Byung-Hun Park's group in the Hapdong Assembly strongly opposed to this decision. He blamed that this reunification movement with the Tonghap group was a liberal, communist, and the Super Church movement. However, under the assurance of McIntire, Park was more interested in intercepting a property for Yongsan Seminary bought with \$35,000's financial aid from ICCC. Finally the Hohun (protecting the constitution) group split off from the Hapdong Assembly in 1962.<sup>93</sup> Again, money, personal ambition, and a disturbing foreign influence were the contributing factor of the schism in 1962.

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<sup>92</sup>Byoung-Shik Park, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., pp. 100-101.

The divisive character of the Hohun group due to its poor leadership,<sup>94</sup> a factionalism, and the continuing influence of ICCC reached the one Hohun Assembly in 1962 to 7 Assemblies in 1981. In 1979, the Hapdong Assembly divided into the two groups because of the struggle over the ecclesiastical power. Again, the anti-mainstream group of the 1979 split divided into 4 Assemblies in 1980 due to the ecclesiastical power struggles.<sup>95</sup>

### C. Assessment to these Conservative Schisms

Comparing with the first three major schism, the characteristics of the splits after 1959 became very personal, spontaneous, multiple, non-directional, and irrational. What were the essential factors to these phenomena? First of all, I think that it was a serious collapse of the ecclesiastical authority originated in the Japanese colonialism. After the unprepared liberation from a distorted authority<sup>96</sup> of the Japanese regime

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<sup>94</sup>Since the group of the Rev. Jai-Muk Song, who became very close to ICCC, opposed to and split from off the group of the Rev. Byung-Hun Park, the main-stream of the Hohun group which used to be very supportive to ICCC, the Park's group withdrew its pro-policy toward ICCC. Nai-Soo Park, op. cit., p. 44. This split proves that it originated not in a ideological, theological, administrative, and politic dispute among the leadership, but in a self-interest for the ecclesiastical power, an extremely poor characteristic of the leadership.

<sup>95</sup>Nai-Soo Park, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

<sup>96</sup>The authority from the Japanese regime was a really distorted one. First, the authority came not from the people of Korea but from the forced foreign power. Second, the authority forced Koreans to serve for the sake of the Japanese colonialism. Third, the authority was not a democratic but a very authoritarian. Since the Korean Presbyterian Church was very nationalistic and conservative from the beginning of the Japanese annexation, the Japanese



provided the Korean church with a great confusion of the ecclesiastical authority, the church completely failed to reestablish a new authority for the Korean church. The three major split was resulted from this complete failure of building a new ecclesiastical authority after the liberation. Then, it was the three major splits that brought the deteriorating aspects into the later schism of the Korean Presbyterian Church and accelerated it to be multiplied.

Secondly, the defensive characteristics of the conservative theology was another factor to the multiplicity of the schism in the Korean conservative church. Francis Schaeffer makes an interesting comment on this issue, saying, "The disunity or the schismatic phenomenon of the church occurred more frequently in the conservative churches."<sup>97</sup> This is true to the Korean Presbyterian Church. After the third major schism in 1959, there were four major groups in the Korean Presbyterian Church: Koryu, Hankuk, Tonghap, and Hapdong. While the Assembly of Hankuk (liberal) and Tonghap (mid-stream) group remained one, the other two conservative Assemblies had been multiplied into many Assemblies.

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authorities had been very oppressive to these two trends of the Korean church due to the following two reasons: First, nationalism was a strong consciousness to deny the secular authority of the Japanese regime, Second, conservatism held a strong belief in another authority, an authority from God, which sustained the Korean church from the Japanese persecution. However, the forced authority of the Japanese regime finally succeeded in making the Korean Presbyterian Church be officially submissive to the Shrine worship, a form of forced authority from the Japanese authority. It was this submission that caused a direct reason for the first major schism.

<sup>97</sup>Nai-Soo Park, op. cit., p. 22.

Prof. Wan-Sang Han, a Christian sociologist, defines the essence of the conservative in the following sentence, arguing, "The conservative theology is a theology and a method to defend the essence of the historical Christianity in the process of time and history."<sup>98</sup> The schismatic character of the conservative theology originates in the verb, "defend" which implies an exclusive nature rather than an inclusive spirit.

Under the rigid, exclusive and closed atmosphere of the Korean theological educational tradition implanted by the early strict conservative missionaries,<sup>99</sup> the Korean Presbyterian Church took the defensive aspect of the conservative theology seriously. Thus, dialogue, for many Korean conservatives, had been regarded as compromise or syncretism which ruined the purity of Christianity. Old tradition had always been regarded better than new one. There was no edge, for them, between right and wrong. It was this closed and fixed attitude of the conservative theology that played an important role to cause the multiplicity of the divisions in the Korean Presbyterian churches.

Thirdly, the individualistic character of the Korean Presbyterian Church related to another shortcoming of the conservative theology was an important factor to the multiplicity of the schism in the Korean church. While neglecting the communal

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<sup>98</sup>Hwan-Sang Han, Isn't the Korean Church OK (Seoul: The Korean Christian Press, 1982), p. 212.

<sup>99</sup>Kyung-Bae Min, op. cit., p. 274. cf. F.H. Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905 (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 55.

salvation, the conservative churches mainly stressed on the individual salvation which led most concerns of Christian to dwell within self-interest and just one's own congregation. Thus, communal concerns such as social salvation, Christian social ethic, and the ecumenical concerns became a secondary matter.<sup>100</sup> This attitude of individualistic Christianity resulted in the multiplicity of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church.

Fourthly, the polity of the Korean Presbyterian Church was another reason for the multiplicity of the church schism. The Korean Methodist Church had not seriously suffered with the struggle of the church split like that of the Presbyterian churches. Comparing with the polity of the Korean Methodist Church based on a centralized power structure to supervise ministers and church property, the administrative structure of the Korean Presbyterian Church lacked a structural braking power to stop a divisive trend of split in the church because every local church owns its proprietary right.<sup>101</sup>

Fifthly, the strong influence of the foreign mission was an important fact to multiply the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church. The Machen group missionaries or/and the missionaries from the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Missions under the leadership of Carl McIntire were a real factor to accelerate the schisms. It was Bruce Hunt who initiated the Koryu group to isolate itself from the whole church from 1946. Later joining force of the

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<sup>100</sup>cf. Wan-Sang Han, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>101</sup>Nai-Soo Park, op. cit., p. 26.

missionaries from the Independent Board confirmed this schismatic direction of the Koryu group from 1948. After the Hapdong group's break with ICCC, the divisive influence of ICCC was a powerful factor to multiply the schism in the conservative church, as I explained before.

Although the conflict between the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and the Northern Presbyterian Church was counted as an important factor to the first major schism, the impact of Hunt to the schism could be attributed to his strong theological conviction on the purity of the church. However, the later impacts of the McIntire group missionaries were really deteriorating. The ultimate concern of their mission was to advocate and to spread the policy of Carl McIntire, a leader of the Bible Presbyterian Church and ICCC.

The degenerating influence of ICCC group missionaries was not limited to the Korean Presbyterian Church. The whole conservative churches in Korea had been agitated by their money. Even the Machen and the McIntire groups, two troublesome missions, later began to accuse each other. While the ICCC group denounced Machen and Hunt as extreme separatists, a group of the Koryu Assembly accused ICCC whose theology was too extremely neo-fundamentalistic. But they claimed that their theology were faithful to the orthodox Calvinism.<sup>102</sup>

## VI. Conclusion

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<sup>102</sup>Eui-Hwan Kim, The Challenged Conservative Theology (Seoul: Word of Life Press, 1970), pp. 191-194.

I have primarily explored the historical development of the schism, and the factors to the schism and its impact in the Korean Presbyterian Church with the following four perspectives: historical, socio-political, ecumenical, and missiological perspectives. Since there were many essential factors to the schism related with the social and political context of the Korean society, I have particularly attempted to explain the reason for the schism with the socio-political perspective which revealed some unique characters of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church which had been generally neglected by the traditional approaches.<sup>103</sup>

According to these four perspectives, I attempt to divide the factors to the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church into the following four categories as the essential causes for the

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<sup>103</sup>First of all, the most prevalent approach to the schism of the Korean Presbyterian Church has been limited to a historical method which focused on the chronological sequence of the three major schisms based on three major factors: the Shrine issue, the question of liberalism, and the conflict between NAE and WAC. cf. Yang-Sun Kim, Yong-Bok Chun and Byoung-Shik Park. However, although I have heavily employed the historical approach, if using only the historical approach, the deep analysis of the schism will be limited. Secondly, the well analyzed work of Harvie Conn is based on the historical and theological approaches. However, his method only emphasized on the factors of the schism within the church without considering thoroughly the essential reason for the schism from outside of the church. Finally, Nai-Soo Park employed an insightful approach to categorize the schism with six types: theological, political, class struggling, ideological, ecclesiastical power conflicting, and spontaneous causes. Although his research with this method is still rough to be completed, his new perspective to the schism is very valuable to be developed and to further the study of the schism. In addition, it is noticeable that there has been almost not much work on the schisms after 1959.

schism:<sup>104</sup> foreign, socio-political, theological, and human factors. Firstly, factors initiated by foreign missionary, organization, and nation will be categorized by the foreign factors such as the role of Bruce Hunt, the individualistic, materialistic, regionalistic, and anti-intellectual aspects of the Nevius Method, impacts from ICCC, and the Japanese colonialism. Secondly, factors originated in the social, economical, cultural, and political context of the Korean society will be arranged by the socio-political factors such as collapse of authority, question of the leadership, regionalism, and the independent structure of the Korean Presbyterian Church. Thirdly, factors related to doctrinal, theological, and biblical issue will be arranged by the theological factors such as Jai-Jun Kim's liberalism and Hyung-Yong Park's conservatism. Fourthly, factors originated in personal or human desire will be categorized by the human factors such as ambition for the ecclesiastical power.

I realized from this study that there were two hindering understandings of the schism which prevented from seeing the consistent real force behind the occurrence of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church: a simply justification of the inevitability of the schism and a simply generalization of the main cause of the schism as human factor. Firstly, comparing with the

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<sup>104</sup>Rogness attempts to break some factors to the schism into four categories: doctrinal, ministerial and structural, liturgical and pietistic, and social factors. Michael Rogness, The Church Nobody Knows (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1971), pp. 37; 49. His categorization except the doctrinal and social factor does not fit into the context of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church.

split of Paul and Barnabas in the early Church (cf. Acts 16:36-41), a group of conservatives tend to justify simply the inevitability of the schism to defend a purity of the Christian doctrine or faith. Since there are many inevitable reasons for the schism such as doctrinal dispute, these people contend that they do not have to be afraid of splitting with an avoidable reason.<sup>105</sup>

Considering current existing denominationalism in the Church in earth, it is probably true that the schism of the Church in earth is inevitable. However, how do they answer the question that how many schisms in the Korean Presbyterian Church were resulted from an avoidable reason for the schism? Is the above assumption reasonable answer for the multiplicity of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church? What is the inevitable reason for the schism? Was the split of Paul and Barnabas really an unavoidable schism?

Before justifying an inevitability of the schism, the Korean Presbyterian Church had to remember the following two facts. First, the church used to be one church until 1952. Second, Although there are some differences to interpret, every Korean Presbyterian churches basically share the same Westminster Confession, the biblical oriented tradition, and the Calvinism. This great common ground of the Korean Presbyterian Church should not be ignored. Therefore, before justifying the unavoidability of the schism, the Korean Presbyterian Church should seriously reflect the problematic issue of the schism in order to build a future possible unity of the church at first.

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<sup>105</sup>Yong-Bok Chun, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

Secondly, a group of people assume that the main reason for the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church originated in human factors.<sup>106</sup> Generally speaking, it is correct that many aspects of the schism were related to human factors such as human desire to power. Considering that every human affairs include human factors, the schism, one form of human affairs cannot be denied its close connection with human factors. However, I think that this view is too general, simple and pessimistic to see a real cause for the schism behind human factors.

The main force of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church, for me, originated in the collapse of authority in the Korean society as well as in the Korean church after liberation in 1945. Since there was neither authentic criteria to clarify nor authentic procedure to create new authority for both the church and the state, people began to raise a serious question of authority and competed to obtain new authority. Just as the state failed to transform itself into an authentic government held a true authority based on Korean people, the Presbyterian church did not succeed in creating new ecclesiastical authority based on the consensus of the whole church in Korea. This failure of creating new authentic

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<sup>106</sup>The Rev. Goak attributes the fundamental reason for the schism to a human factor. Sun-Hee Goak, "A New Approach toward the Unity of the Church," Good News (February, 1969):14. Chul-Ha Han asserts that the main reason for the schism was not because of different thought but because of human will to split. Byoung-Shik Park, op. cit. p. 79. This view is a very common conclusion on the schism of the Korean Presbyterian which hinders to see the real cause behind this phenomenon in terms of socio-political perspectives. If we begin to attribute primarily the essential cause for the schism to human factors, there is nothing much to say about the cause for the schism except increasing morality.



authority caused Presbyterians to keep challenging the question of the ecclesiastical authority which resulted in the first three major schisms.

The repeated collapse of the ecclesiastical authority during the first three major schisms accelerated the later multiplying schisms in the Korean Presbyterian Church. The following three facts will support this assertion. First, although there were many factors to contribute the first major schism, the failure of the church rehabilitation, a failure of creating new authority, was the main cause for the first major schism which directly or indirectly continued to influence on the development of the later schisms. Second, it was very evident that most of the schism was resulted from the conflicts among the leadership of the church who was motivated and tempted to engage in the struggle over obtaining the new ecclesiastical authority.<sup>107</sup> Third, since it was the period of questioning authority due to the collapse of authority, the church was unable to sustain and exercise a proper ecclesiastical order and power.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup>In this sense, human factors were a significant contributing factor to the schism. However, it was the collapse of authority that tempted human factors to play an important role to the schism. If the church had been under the properly established authority, human factors would not have been an important contributing factor to the schism.

<sup>108</sup>It was this reason that the Rev. Kil-Chang Kim, a formerly active pro-Japanese leader, was able to avoid his responsibility to have been strongly supportive to the Japanese oppressive policy against the Korean church. The vacuum of the authority made the contradictory decisions of the 32nd Assembly and the 36th Assembly on Chosun Seminary possible without careful consideration and proper legal procedure. Under this chaos of authority, Dr. Hyung-Yong Park was able to justify the seemingly reason for his serious

Although considering its divisive characteristics, the Korean Presbyterian Church still have many common grounds that can be employed to build unity. There are not many schisms resulted from seemingly inevitable factors to be justified. The main reason for the schism is not just limited to the problematic character of human nature which made a systematic effort to stop the schism as social phenomena difficult.

The schism rather originated in the total collapse of the old ecclesiastical authority during the Japanese annexation and the failure of creating new authentic authority in the Korean society as well as in the Korean Presbyterian Church based on a very independent and individualistic church structure after liberation in 1945. Thus, if the Korean church succeeds to reestablish its authority through its continuing efforts of the church reform, one of essences of the Reformed tradition, there is a hope for unity in the Korean Presbyterian Church.

In addition, Smith introduces an interesting observation of the schism in the Korean Presbyterian Church.<sup>109</sup> He argues that the divisiveness of the Korean church is the very zeal of the church which is in strength and which can led to divisiveness. Protestant history shows examples of a similar separatism at a time when convictions were strongly held and when the Church was faced with

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involvement in the first three major schisms as keeping the pure conservative tradition of the old Pyungyang Seminary, and to avoid his responsibility of misusing money regardless of his intention.

<sup>109</sup>John C. Smith, "Policy Lessons From Korea," International Review of Missions 50 (1961):324.

new decision. Therefore, he continues to assert that there is a sense in which even the difficulties that the Korean church faces today are a mark of its residual strength. As a person who is responsible for the Korean church in new generation, one of the important purposes of this study on the schism is to attempt to transform this very residual strength of the Korean Presbyterian Church into a force to build its unity.

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